I will go over steps on how to export the list of users with their UPN, Object ID, primary SMTP address and Alias email address.
The Get-AzureADUser cmdlet comes in handy to pull all the user details in this scenario. The Mail attribute contains the Primary SMTP address of the user and the Primary SMTP address and Alias email address are stored in the ProxyAddresses attribute in Azure AD. The ProxyAddresses attribute is a multi-value property. The Primary SMTP address can be easily identified as it is in this format, SMTP:user@emaple.com The upper-case SMTP denotes that it the primary email address.
When an object is synced from on-premise Active Directory to Azure AD, the values in the proxyAddresses attribute in AD are compared with Azure AD rules and then populated in Azure AD. So, the values of the proxyAddresses attribute in AD may not match the ProxyAddresses attribute in AzureAD.
Export all users to csv file
The below script will pull all Azure AD users,
Connect-AzureAD
$Output = @() #create an empty array
$AzureADUsers = Get-AzureADUser -All $true | Select DisplayName,UserprincipalName,ObjectId,Mail,ProxyAddresses #Get all Azure AD users
ForEach ($User in $AzureADUsers)
{
$Output += New-Object PSObject -property $([ordered]@{ #fetch user detail and add to $output
UserName = $User.DisplayName
UserprincipalName = $User.UserprincipalName
UserId = $User.objectId
SMTPAddress = $User.Mail
AliasSMTPAddresses = ($User.ProxyAddresses | Where-object {$_ -clike 'smtp:*'} | ForEach-Object {$_ -replace 'smtp:',''}) -join ','
})
}
$Output | Export-csv "C:\tmp\O365Users_$((Get-Date).ToString("MMddyyyy_HHmmss")).csv" -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 #Export users to csv file
Microsoft recently announced they will disable basic authentication for all M365 tenants. This deadline has been pushed postponed due to the impact of COVID-19 across the globe.
Latest update: The latest from Microsoft is, effective October 1, 2022 Basic authentication will be disabled in all tenants.
The following components of Exchange Online will be affected,
Exchange Web Services(EWS)
POP
IMAP
Exchange ActiveSync
Remote PowerShell
Why is this a big deal?
Basic authentication uses username and password for client access requests. This used to be the industry standard during the time which organizations didn’t understand the cost of security breaches. It poses a significant security risk as Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams have exposed organizations to billions of dollars in potential losses. Check out this 2019 report from ProofPoint that goes into details.
Disabling Basic Authentication will help protect Exchange Online from brute force or password spray attacks. As the above mentioned report goes into, IMAP-based password-spraying campaigns are very effective in particular.
Beyond all this, Basic Authentication doesn’t enforce MFA and this should be the biggest driver for organizations to move away from it.
Is Basic Authentication enabled in your tenant?
Here is how to check if Basic Authentication is enabled in your tenant,
Settings –> Org Settings –> Services –> Modern Authentication
Screenshot above shows how to check if ‘Basic Auth’ is enabled in tenant
Determine who is using Basic Authentication in your tenant
Before you turn off basic authentication for protocols, view your sign-in reports in the Azure AD portal to determine who is using it in your organization.
This can be determined using sign-in logs in Azure AD.
In your Azure AD admin center, Click the ‘Sign-in logs’ blade.,
Select ‘Last 1 month‘ in the Date
Add a ‘Client app‘ as a second filter, choose all options under the ‘Legacy Authentication Clients‘ and click ‘Apply‘
Azure AD sign-ins | Basic Auth filter
With this report information, you can contact the application and account owners to determine why Basic Authentication is still in use. This information will also come in handy later if you are planning to allow exceptions to these accounts/applications. I’ve covered it later in this post.
Disable Basic Authentication
Before you begin,
Verify Modern Authentication is enabled
Verify your email clients are Modern Authentication capable
In this post, I’ve elaborated how to block Basic Authentication using Azure AD conditional access.
IMO, the easiest method to disable Basic Authentication is to use authentication policies.
With Authentication policies you can,
Apply a default organization level policy that blocks Basic Authentication
Apply a per user policy to allow certain protocols. Example: ActiveSync
Create Authentication Policy
This creates an authentication policy named ‘Block Basic Auth’
New-AuthenticationPolicy -Name "Block Basic Auth"
When you create a new authentication policy without specifying any protocols, Basic Authentication is blocked for all client protocols in Exchange Online.
The default value of the AllowBasicAuth* parameters (switches) is False for all protocols.
Set Default Authentication Policy
The default policy is assigned to all users in the tenant who don’t have a specific policy assigned to them. To configure the default authentication policy for the organization, use this:
Authentication policies assigned to users take precedence over the default organization policy.
To enable Basic authentication for a specific protocol that’s disabled, specify the switch without a value
To disable Basic authentication for a specific protocol that’s enabled, use the value :$false
In this scenario, I’m creating an authentication policy to allow ActiveSync. This is sometimes typical in organizations where users will have Intune managed devices but would like to add second O365 email from a different tenant. The Outlook app prevents this but the built-in mail app can be used with ActiveSync to fetch email.
To get all users assigned to a policy you need to get the policy’s DN using the cmdlet Get-AuthenticationPolicy,
$PolicyId = Read-Host "Enter policy ID in distinguished name format"
Get-User -Filter "AuthenticationPolicy -eq '$PolicyId'"
Assign policy to user, confirm and get all users assigned to a policy
Determine policy DN using ‘Get-AuthenticationPolicy’
By default, when you create or change the authentication policy assignment on users or update the policy, the changes take effect within 24 hours. If you want the policy to take effect within 30 minutes, use the following syntax:
This example below immediately applies the authentication policy to multiple users. As I’m in the same PowerShell session and haven’t changed the variables you used to identify the users,
The default setting for all organizations using Teams is the phone numbers are masked from the participants outside of the organization. The phone numbers are fully displayed to internal participants.
Based on certain uses cases and added privacy, Teams administrators have the ability to choose how the participants’ phone numbers appear in meetings. Options available,
Phone numbers are not masked, which makes it visible to everyone in the meeting
Phone numbers are masked for everyone except the organizer
Phone numbers are masked only from external participants
Using PowerShell to define phone-number masking
Use the MaskPstnNumbersType parameter of the Set-CsOnlineDialInConferencingTenantSettings cmdlet to change PSTN masking setting,
Many organizations implement MFA as a common requirement for security and to address identity theft. Legacy authentication doesn’t support MFA. Blocking legacy authentication will improve your tenant’s protection.
I have detailed on how to disable protocols using basic authentication using authentication policies in a different post here. I’ll go into detail on how to block legacy authentication using Azure AD Conditional Access.
Remember: Conditional Access policies take effect after the first-factor authentication is completed. In a scenario where a user's credentials were leaked, then attackers use it to gain access but signal generated from these events like location of the request, sign-in risk level can be used to block access.
Clients using legacy authentication cannot enforce MFA. Examples of such applications,
Microsoft Office 2013 or older
Apps using mail protocols like IMAP, POP
Block legacy authentication
There are two ways Conditional Access policies can be used to block legacy authentication,
I typically prefix Conditional Access policies with ‘Grant Access’ or ‘Block Access’ in the tenants I manage.
Under Users
Include : ‘All users’
I’ll exclude ‘Global administrator’ role just to be on the safe side of things
Include and Exclude in Conditional Access policy
Under ‘Cloud apps or actions‘
Include : All cloud apps
Exclude : None
cloud apps and actions
In Conditions –> Client Apps,
Select ‘Yes‘ to configure policy
Uncheck ‘Browser‘ and ‘Mobile apps and desktop clients‘ which are checked by default
‘Exchange ActiveSync clients‘ and ‘Other clients‘ needs to be left checked
Click ‘Done‘
client apps
Grant: Select ‘Block access‘
Block access
While taking this approach, it is better to set the policy to ‘Report Only‘. This way, you can get some insights on what is using legacy authentication and hopefully you won’t break business critical applications in a production environment. Or if you like living life on the edge, go for it and set it to ‘On‘
Indirect Method
In this method, the policy creation steps are same as the ‘Direct method’.
When it comes to choosing the ‘Client apps‘, Configure ‘No‘
In ‘Grant‘, select ‘Grant Access‘ and ‘Require multi-factor authentication‘ and ‘Require Hybrid Azure AD joined device‘
During authentication, legacy authentication clients don’t support sending MFA, Azure AD join state or device compliance. When we apply policies with grant controls to all client applications, the legacy authentication based sign-ins that cannot satisfy these required grant controls are blocked.
Client apps – No
Grant access – MFA, Azure AD joined
Conditional Access policies can take up 24 hours to take effect. Please keep this in mind while rolling out changes in a production environment. What seems to be working immediately after you put the policy in place might not work when you wake up the next day as the policy is just taking effect or even worse while you are on a camping weekend with no cell coverage..Live and learn.. I guess.😁
In Azure AD, Seamless Single Sign-on can be configured when Password Hash Sync or Pass through authentication is configured. Azure AD Seamless SSO automatically signs in users when they are in their corporate owned devices and one the corporate network. This helps save a lot of time without repeatedly typing credentials in to Azure AD and other Azure AD integrated applications.
When we enable Azure AD Seamless SSO, a computer account named AZUREADSSOACC is created in on-premises AD in each AD forest. This computer account represent Azure AD in the on-premises AD. Considering how important this computer object is, it is better to take the following steps to protect it,
Move it into a OU,
Where they are safe from accidental deletions
Where only domain admins have access
Ensure that Kerberos delegation on the computer account is disabled
No other accounts in AD have delegation permissions
This can be easy to miss if you have permissions sprawl
The Kerberos decryption key for this computer account is securely shared with Azure AD. Microsoft recommends to roll over the Kerberos decryption Key at least every30 days. You will notice a warning when the key has not been updated in the past 30 days.
Azure AD warning
Kerberos decryption key
As I mentioned earlier, Microsoft recommends to roll over the keys at least every 30 days. Obviously, I can remember it promptly or even put a meeting invite in Outlook to recur 30 days, keep snoozing it to eventually dismiss the alert because I’m stuck doing something else on that day. I’m sure this feels very familiar to most of you reading this. 😂
This is a great scenario where automation can come in handy and I’ll go through the steps on how I implemented this.
Prerequisites
Below are the requirements for implementing this solution.
Global admin account
With MFA exception (preferably by origin IP)
Administrator account on AD Connect server with logon as a batch job
On-Premises AD domain admin account
Domain account that has permissions to ‘login as batch service’ on the Azure AD connect server
I covered in later half of another post about securely storing credentials using PowerShell into a file. Run these below lines to store encrypted credentials into a text file. This is far better than storing the password in plain text.
Remember, this method is secure but not 100% safe.